Comment of Prof. O’Meara

1. I thank M. Hadot for the compliment of reviewing my book at such length.

2. My topic was rigidly limited (see p. 205) to the attempt to prove the identity of the Philosophy from Oracles and the de regressu and to the corollary to such a conclusion. I deliberately avoided discussion of points that were not immediately relevant (see Hadot p. 206; p. 210, n. 20; p. 214, n. 36; p. 224, n. 67; p. 227 et p. 235).

3. M. Hadot has clear ideas of what is, and what is not, to be found in both the works in question. He opens his discussion by laying down the law (207). He even says: ‘Ce résumé prouve (my italics) que dans le de regressu animae, Porphyre prend une attitude critique vis-à-vis des Chaldéens (différente de ce qui se révèle dans la Philosophie des Oracles)’ (p. 212). The résumé, of course, proves nothing whatever. Scholars have time and again been proved wrong in their assumptions of what lost works, later recovered, might or might not contain. M. Hadot is confident that, for example, there could be no distinction made in the Philosophy from Oracles between the anima spiritualis and the anima intellectualis (p. 226) — he should take warning from the experience of those who denied that the Chaldean Oracles were used in the Philosophy from Oracles, or the term ‘theurgy’ employed in it. These too were precise details; but Lewy, has shown that the denial was wrong on both points. Not only is the distinction to which M. Hadot refers not excluded by the fragments which are admitted of the Philosophy from Oracles, but the preface to the work suggests two levels of the process of salvation which may correspond to the two souls. M. Hadot resorts to such terms as ‘ton’ (p. 214, p. 243) and ‘attitude’ (p. 227) to help on his argument — a dangerous expedient. I thought that I had sufficiently stressed the decisive text of Porphyry’s own preface to the Philosophy from Oracles with regard to the philosophic, as contrasted with the divinatory, content of the book: this and the extraordinary consistency and frequency of Augustine’s Porphyrian schema are more fundamental and reliable as guides than the earlier notions of Bidez or those (see Hadot p. 235 ñ.) who in this matter follow him.

4. M. Hadot makes some important assertions for which he offers no
proof, e. g. p. 216 n. 47: 'il faut préciser ... que tous les textes en question supposent le de regressu...'; p. 218: 'Augustin a construit un digest porphyrien...'; p. 220: 'Les citations du chapitre 26 proviennent du de regressu animae' (amend to: the important quotation omne corpus fugiendum comes from the book described in civ. dei. X 29 and 32 only as de regressu animae); p. 222: 'Cela veut dire qu'à Milan, vers 386, la découverte du de regressu...'(what is the meaning of découverte?); p. 223: 'tout ce que nous savons du de regressu grâce à Augustin et à Ambroise devient incompréhensible' (write: will have to be revised).

5. He arrives at conclusions which are not legitimate, e. g. 221 'Il ne s'agit pas dans le de regressu, d'une objection à la résurrection du Christ. Il s'agit d'un conseil moral et métaphysique...' (But the fact that it is a precept does not exclude its use against the resurrection of Christ: on the contrary, if it was accepted as a conseil, it would be the more effective as an argument — and one cannot dismiss the fact that our knowledge of this Porphyrian precept comes precisely from Augustine and from contexts of resurrection); p. 239: 'le de regressu dit: le seul salut est dans la vie contemplative ...' — the text quoted (p. 238) denies just this (even if the de regressu elsewhere does commends it).

6. In general M. Hadot's review is more concerned with expounding his theory, developed from Winter, that civ. dei X is inspired to a large extent by the Letter to Anébo. He observed (p. 227) evidently that I considered the possibility that the Letter might also be part of the Philosophy from Oracles. I postponed the examination of this question, but am happy to see that M. Hadot has anticipated at least one aspect of my work. My very brief remark on p. 108 that '(the Letter) covers closely many of the topics of the Philosophy from Oracles'.is sufficient indication, even if my preoccupation with significant phrases throughout the whole of civ. dei X was not an additional assurance, that I was aware of the parallel mentioned by M. Hadot (p. 232) but could not use it on account of my particular purpose in the present work.

Personally I would have more confidence in trying to show the similarities between the Letter and the de regressu, and between both and the Philosophy from Oracles, than in seeking to distinguish between them. This can be done only by fixing on phrases and ideas as being not only characteristic of one but necessarily excluded from the others — as, e. g. M. Hadot does on p. 229: the notion of démon trompeur; pace M. Hadot, is certainly implied in civ. dei XIX 23 and in the fragments. M. Hadot is nearer the truth when he says (p. 225) that Porphyry's attitudes in the Letter and the de regressu are 'mélangées même dans certaines phrases.' He is still nearer the truth when he says (p. 225): 'Ainsi la lettre à Anébon, le de regressu et la Philosophie des Oracles sont les trois ouvrages, dans lesquels Augustin, en ce livre X, puisse son information. Souvent
il est difficile de distinguer nettement à quel ouvrage Augustin fait allusion ' Or again (p. 240) : ' Quant au livre X de la Cité de Dieu, je pense en conclusion qu'il utilise probablement, sans que nous puissions toujours les distinguer nettement : la Philosophie des Oracles, la lettre à Anébon, et le de regressu. ' 

I venture to think that anyone reading M. Hadot on p. 232 will feel that, through an understandable affection for his own theory, he does violence to the evidence : ' Sans doute l'argumentation de M. O'M. en faveur d'une utilisation de la Philosophie des Oracles, en ce chapitre 21, est-elle très forte et je serai prêt à m'y rallier d'autant plus que la pluralité des sources porphyriennes du livre X me semble un fait assuré... ' But he proceeds to say (p. 233) : ' l'allusion à la conjuration du mauvais démon ... peut se comprendre dans le cadre de la lettre à Anébon, même si elle est attestée très clairement dans la Philosophie des Oracles (italics mine). ' To admit, as he does (224), that the first seven chapters of civ. dei X are evidently inspired by the Philosophy from Oracles, a work the title of which is known from many sources, and to feel an inability often to distinguish between it as a source and the other two, is in effect to encourage the expectation of finding more fragments of the Philosophy from Oracles in the rest of civ. dei X than the few already accepted. 

7. M. Hadot misunderstands my position on a number of points, e. g.; p. 211 : I do not put forward the hypothesis attributed to me under Ia mine (p. 74) is nearer to number 2. I do not argue, as M. Hadot says (p. 241), from non legi quod to legi quod non. In certain circumstances, as in the context in question, the one can not only include the other, but clearly includes it. 

The apparent suggestion (p. 207) that I deliberately mislead readers in seeming to convey the impression that Lewy and myself agree on a detail, when we do not agree, is not, I feel, intended : the philological remarks in question were entirely mine ; Lewy was quoted as supporting the translation of a Greek phrase which I gave. 

8. Finally M. Hadot has hardly taken into account the questions of chronology and the difficulties about the title of the de regressu which are dealt with in Part I of my book. In doing so he robs the discussion of much of its purpose and significance. One can understand his preoccupation with the theory about the Letter to Anebo and therefore his special interest in Part II. This, however, has distracted him from doing justice to the question as a whole.

John O'Meara.